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The Ethics of Human EnhancementUnderstanding the Debate$
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Steve Clarke, Julian Savulescu, Tony Coady, Alberto Giubilini, and Sagar Sanyal

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780198754855

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198754855.001.0001

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Enhancement, Mind-Uploading, and Personal Identity

Enhancement, Mind-Uploading, and Personal Identity

Chapter:
(p.184) 13 Enhancement, Mind-Uploading, and Personal Identity
Source:
The Ethics of Human Enhancement
Author(s):

Nicholas Agar

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198754855.003.0013

Many of the most ambitious enhancement scenarios involve mind-uploading, the transfer of human identities out of disease-prone, computationally clumsy biological brains into more powerful computationally powerful devices. This chapter argues that mind-uploading inevitably fails to transfer what matters in survival out of human brains and into computers. Here the author understands uploading as essentially involving copying. The argument offered is metaphysically neutral between accounts of personal identity. Copying does not satisfy a necessary condition for the transmission of human identities.

Keywords:   mind-uploading, identity, survival, copying, enhancement

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