Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocratic Survival$

Abel Escribà-Folch and Joseph Wright

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780198746997

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198746997.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2017. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: null; date: 26 February 2017

(p.281) Appendix E

(p.281) Appendix E

Source:
Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocratic Survival
Author(s):

Abel Escribà-Folch

Joseph Wright

Publisher:
Oxford University Press

Chapter 8 Table

(p.282)

Table E.1. Military intervention and regime transitions

Dependent variable

All regime failures (1–3)

Democratic transition (4–6)

Autocratic transition (7–9)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

DHI

1.755**

1.963**

0.103**

1.791+

3.776*

0.074*

1.114*

0.889

0.029

(0.44)

(0.53)

(0.03)

(0.95)

(1.63)

(0.03)

(0.52)

(0.56)

(0.02)

AHI

0.378

1.258**

0.039*

0.852

1.779*

0.028*

−0.096

0.798

0.011

(0.40)

(0.44)

(0.02)

(0.70)

(0.79)

(0.01)

(0.52)

(0.56)

(0.02)

DHI × Personal

−0.469

−0.017

−4.115+

−0.063

1.097

0.046

(0.97)

(0.06)

(2.37)

(0.05)

(1.23)

(0.04)

AHI × Personal

−1.970*

−0.070*

−2.356

−0.024

−2.054*

−0.046

(0.82)

(0.04)

(1.57)

(0.02)

(0.93)

(0.03)

Personalist

0.303

0.449

0.039

−0.267

−0.104

0.006

0.384

0.545

0.033

(0.43)

(0.43)

(0.03)

(1.09)

(1.05)

(0.02)

(0.54)

(0.57)

(0.03)

Log GDP pc

−0.088

−0.119

−0.018

−0.206

0.050

0.000

−0.759

−0.622

−0.018

(0.49)

(0.49)

(0.02)

(1.22)

(1.30)

(0.01)

(0.58)

(0.60)

(0.01)

Log population

−4.354**

−4.306**

−0.126**

−11.046*

−10.766*

−0.076**

−0.422

−0.418

−0.050+

(1.39)

(1.41)

(0.03)

(5.25)

(5.17)

(0.03)

(1.49)

(1.56)

(0.03)

Civil war

0.529*

0.546*

0.028*

0.038

0.037

−0.000

0.822**

0.904**

0.028**

(0.22)

(0.23)

(0.01)

(0.40)

(0.44)

(0.01)

(0.27)

(0.28)

(0.01)

(Intercept)

34.095**

33.700**

1.320**

81.218

77.467

0.618*

1.962

0.669

0.703*

(12.83)

(13.05)

(0.38)

(54.79)

(54.22)

(0.28)

(15.56)

(15.88)

(0.30)

β‎DHI + β‎DHI × Personal

1.494+

0.086

−0.339

0.011

1.987+

0.075*

(0.84)

(0.05)

(1.57)

(0.05)

(1.13)

(0.03)

β‎AHI + β‎AHI × Personal

−0.712

−0.031

−0.577

0.004

−1.255

−0.035

(0.72)

(0.03)

(1.36)

(0.02)

(0.83)

(0.03)

Log-likelihood

−553.4

−549.9

432.7

−229.1

−224.9

1752.6

−319.1

−316.8

1452.5

Observations

2855

2855

3567

1542

1542

3567

1709

1709

3567

Regimes

220

220

241

158

158

241

181

181

241

Countries

85

85

106

63

63

106

57

57

106

Estimator

FE

FE

FE

FE

FE

FE

FE

FE

FE

Logit

Logit

LPM

Logit

Logit

LPM

Logit

Logit

LPM

(+) p < 0.10;

(*) p < 0.05;

(**) p < 0.01. DHI ≡ Democratic Hostile Intervention; AHI ≡ Autocratic Hostile Intervention. Conditional logit and FE linear probability model (LPM) with clustered standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is regime transition, as specified in the column headings. Duration time polynomials and interactions with regime type, and country and year effects included but not reported. Sample years: 1947–2005.

(p.283)