Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocratic Survival$

Abel Escribà-Folch and Joseph Wright

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780198746997

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198746997.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2017. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: null; date: 21 February 2017

(p.273) Appendix C

(p.273) Appendix C

Source:
Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocratic Survival
Author(s):

Abel Escribà-Folch

Joseph Wright

Publisher:
Oxford University Press

Chapter 6 Tables

Table C.1. U.N. resolutions, aid, and sanctions

Bilateral aid

Multilateral aid

Sanction

Democracy sanction

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Dependent variable t–1

0.452**

0.345**

−0.266**

−0.246**

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.03)

Shame

0.137

−0.159

−0.007

−0.012

(0.13)

(0.17)

(0.01)

(0.01)

Personal × Shame

−0.510**

−0.532*

0.028+

0.021

(0.19)

(0.25)

(0.02)

(0.01)

Military × Shame

−0.148

−0.155

0.014

0.019

(0.16)

(0.21)

(0.02)

(0.02)

Party × Shame

−0.253

−0.089

(0.18)

(0.24)

Personalist

0.017

−0.039

−0.000

0.007

(0.06)

(0.07)

(0.05)

(0.04)

Military

−0.000

0.079

0.019

−0.006

(0.06)

(0.08)

(0.07)

(0.06)

Party

0.042

−0.121

(0.06)

(0.08)

∆Repression

−0.043*

0.002

(0.02)

(0.02)

Repression t−1

−0.024

−0.000

−0.041*

−0.042**

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.02)

(0.01)

∆ Civil liberties

−0.012

0.011

(0.02)

(0.03)

Civil liberties t−1

−0.004

−0.004

(0.01)

(0.02)

ln(GDPpc) t−1

−0.072+

−0.223**

0.042

0.001

(0.04)

(0.05)

(0.04)

(0.03)

ln(Pop) t−1

−0.943**

−1.283**

−0.085

−0.106+

(0.23)

(0.31)

(0.09)

(0.06)

U.S. agree t−1

−0.346*

0.297

(0.15)

(0.21)

War

−0.101**

−0.095+

−0.035

−0.023

(0.04)

(0.05)

(0.03)

(0.03)

Capabilities

−1.859

2.845

(1.88)

(2.55)

(Intercept)

17.485**

23.433**

0.513

0.765+

(3.75)

(5.05)

(0.69)

(0.45)

R-squared

0.35

0.24

0.16

0.16

Observations

2121

2114

1663

1663

(+) p < 0.10;

(*) p < 0.05;

(**) p < 0.01. Fixed effects OLS; standard errors in parentheses. The natural log of aid per capita is the dependent variable in (1) and (2); 133 regimes in eighty-five autocratic countries from 1979 to 2002. Excluded regime category is democracy (sixty-seven countries). Time trend included but not reported in (1) and (2). All data, except regime type, from Lebovic and Voeten (2009). The dependent variable in (3) and (4) is Sanctiont – Sanctiont–1; 152 regimes in ninety-six countries from 1977 to 2000. Excluded regime category is dominant party. Regime duration polynomials and time period dummies included but not reported.

(p.274) (p.275)

Table C.2. Shaming and regime transitions

Dependent variable

All regime failures

Democratic transition

Autocratic transition

Democratic transition

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

Shaming

0.013

0.005

0.018+

0.011

−0.004

−0.005

0.017+

0.008

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

Shaming × Military

0.051+

0.053+

−0.003

0.046

0.052+

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.03)

Shaming × Personal

−0.002

−0.006

0.005

−0.012

−0.007

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.01)

(0.02)

(0.02)

Military

−0.063

−0.116

−0.033

−0.089

−0.023

−0.019

−0.088

−0.083

(0.06)

(0.07)

(0.05)

(0.06)

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.06)

(0.06)

Personalist

−0.094

−0.088

−0.075+

−0.066

0.008

0.004

−0.068

−0.055

(0.07)

(0.07)

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.06)

(0.06)

(0.04)

(0.05)

Log GDP pc

−0.002

−0.009

−0.015

−0.023

0.004

0.005

−0.006

−0.021

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.03)

Log population

−0.108

−0.119+

−0.041

−0.050

−0.086+

−0.089+

0.058

−0.133*

(0.07)

(0.07)

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.08)

(0.06)

Repression

0.002

0.004

0.019

0.021

−0.028*

−0.028*

0.012

0.021

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

Civil war

0.002

0.003

−0.010

−0.008

0.011

0.011

−0.007

−0.009

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

Violent protest

0.120**

0.118**

0.015

0.012

0.092**

0.091**

−0.007

0.016

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.02)

(0.03)

Aid

0.013

(0.01)

Sanction

0.006

(0.02)

(Intercept)

1.382

1.576

0.737

0.909

0.957

0.982

−0.780

2.053*

(1.00)

(1.03)

(0.74)

(0.76)

(0.73)

(0.74)

(1.12)

(0.90)

β‎Shame + β‎Shame × Military

0.056+

0.064*

−0.007

0.063*

0.060*

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.03)

β‎Shame + β‎Shame × Personal

0.003

0.005

−0.000

0.005

0.001

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.01)

(0.02)

(0.02)

Period FE

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Year FE

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

Y

R-squared

0.13

0.14

0.13

0.14

0.12

0.12

0.16

0.16

Observations

1664

1664

1664

1664

1664

1664

1534

1664

(+) p < 0.10;

(*) p < 0.05;

(**) p < 0.01. Linear probability model with country-fixed effects. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Duration time polynomials and interactions with regime type; period- (or year-) fixed effects; country-fixed effects in all models but not reported. Years: 1977–2001.

(p.276) (p.277)

Table C.3. Two stage model

1st stage (2)

1st stage (5)

Dependent variable

Shame

Democratic transition

Shame

Shame × Mil

Democratic transition

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Shaming

0.066

0.031

(0.07)

(0.06)

Shaming × Military

0.132+

(0.07)

Military

−0.398*

0.005

−0.373

−0.130

−0.128

(0.18)

(0.06)

(0.29)

(0.34)

(0.08)

Log GDP pc

0.156

−0.023

0.156

0.135*

−0.033

(0.14)

(0.03)

(0.14)

(0.05)

(0.03)

Log population

−0.055

−0.049

−0.053

0.119

−0.076+

(0.28)

(0.04)

(0.28)

(0.13)

(0.05)

Repression

−0.419**

0.041

−0.420**

−0.107**

0.041

(0.06)

(0.03)

(0.06)

(0.03)

(0.03)

Civil war (low)

0.090

0.001

0.089

0.042

0.000

(0.07)

(0.02)

(0.07)

(0.03)

(0.02)

Civil war (high)

0.223*

−0.034

0.223*

−0.015

−0.023

(0.10)

(0.03)

(0.10)

(0.05)

(0.03)

Violent protest

0.018

0.011

0.018

0.089+

0.003

(0.10)

(0.02)

(0.10)

(0.05)

(0.03)

Non-violent protest

−0.052

0.185**

−0.052

0.028

0.179**

(0.12)

(0.05)

(0.12)

(0.06)

(0.05)

Anti-government

0.103*

0.023

0.103*

0.024

0.022

demonstrations

(0.04)

(0.01)

(0.04)

(0.02)

(0.02)

Neighbor democracy

0.091+

0.006

0.091+

0.008

0.010

(0.05)

(0.01)

(0.05)

(0.02)

(0.01)

Prior democracy

−0.057

−0.025

−0.054

−0.362

0.002

(0.18)

(0.06)

(0.19)

(0.35)

(0.09)

(Intercept)

0.036

0.002

−2.212

(3.44)

(3.45)

(1.71)

Instrument

36.244**

36.626**

−6.033+

(9.75)

(10.87)

(3.48)

Instrument × Military

−1.587

65.226**

(11.98)

(15.92)

β‎Shame + β‎Shame × Military

0.162

(0.10)

F-statistic

13.8

7.4

10.0

Kleibergen-Paap Wald F

13.2

6.6

Weak ID critical value 10% maximal IV size

16.4

7.0

Weak ID critical value 15% maximal IV size

9.0

4.6

Weak ID critical value 20% maximal IV size

6.7

4.0

(+) p < 0.10;

(*) p < 0.05;

(**) p < 0.01. Linear probability model with country fixed effects. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Duration time polynomials and interactions with regime type, and country fixed effects in all models but not reported. 1601 observations in 95 countries from 1977–2001. The coefficient estimate for β‎Shame + β‎Shame × Military is statistically significant at the 0.102 level.

(p.278)