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Institutions For Future Generations$
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Iñigo González-Ricoy and Axel Gosseries

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780198746959

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2017

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198746959.001.0001

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Electoral Design, Sub-Majority Rules, and Representation for Future Generations

Electoral Design, Sub-Majority Rules, and Representation for Future Generations

Chapter:
(p.214) 13 Electoral Design, Sub-Majority Rules, and Representation for Future Generations
Source:
Institutions For Future Generations
Author(s):

Kristian Skagen Ekeli

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198746959.003.0013

The purpose of this chapter is to present and consider two alternative models for political representation of future generations. The first one has been proposed by Andrew Dobson, and it can be called the restricted franchise model. According to this model, some seats in legislative assemblies should be reserved for special representatives of future generations (F-representatives). These special representatives should be elected, but the rights (a) to elect F-representatives and (b) to serve as F-representatives are restricted to environmentalists or environmental groups and organizations. The second model, which I have recently proposed, can be termed the sub-majority rule model. According to this model, a minority of at least one-third of the legislators should be granted two procedural rights in order to protect future interests. The first empowers a minority to delay legislation. The second grants a minority the right to require referendums.

Keywords:   accountability mechanisms, checks and balances, deliberation, democratic legitimacy, electoral design, representation of future generations, sub-majority rules

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