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International Anti-Corruption NormsTheir Creation and Influence on Domestic Legal Systems$
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Cecily Rose

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780198737216

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198737216.001.0001

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The Domestic Influence of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the Working Group on Bribery

The Domestic Influence of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the Working Group on Bribery

Chapter:
(p.59) 2 The Domestic Influence of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the Working Group on Bribery
Source:
International Anti-Corruption Norms
Author(s):

Cecily Rose

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198737216.003.0003

Chapter 2 examines the 1997 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and related non-binding instruments—the 2009 Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the 2010 Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics, and Compliance. It shows how the OECD’s influence on domestic legal systems has been aided rather than hindered by its association with these non-binding instruments. The US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and UK Bribery Act 2010 both show that the effectiveness of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention has been enhanced because of its capacity to evolve through these recommendations and guidance. The OECD Working Group on Bribery has also influenced domestic implementation and enforcement of the Convention, though it operates on the basis of peer pressure rather than binding sanctions. The domestic influence of the Working Group has its limitations, however, as demonstrated by its hard fought battle for implementation of the Convention in the United Kingdom.

Keywords:   1997 OECD, Anti-Bribery Convention, Working Group on Bribery, US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, UK Bribery Act 2010, deferred prosecution agreement, non-prosecution agreement, monitoring, peer review

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