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SensoramaA Phenomenalist Analysis of Spacetime and Its Contents$
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Michael Pelczar

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780198732655

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732655.001.0001

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Phenomenalism: A first appraisal

Phenomenalism: A first appraisal

(p.127) 7 Phenomenalism: A first appraisal

Michael Pelczar

Oxford University Press

Among idealistic metaphysics, phenomenalism is the most ambitious, and consequently the most heavily criticized. Chapter 7 addresses two of the main criticisms that phenomenalism invites. The first is that phenomenalism makes an unacceptable mystery of the fact that our conscious experiences have the order and regularity they do (or any order and regularity at all), since phenomenalists cannot call on any extra-experiential causes of experiences to explain this order and coherence; the second is that phenomenalism forces us to say that perception never gives us access to anything but our own conscious experiences. A further purpose of Chapter 7 is to argue that phenomenalism, unlike the idealism of Berkeley or Leibniz, does not commit its proponents to a conception of physical things as dependent for their existence on the existence of minds.

Keywords:   phenomenalism, perception, mind-dependence, Leibniz, Berkeley

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