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SensoramaA Phenomenalist Analysis of Spacetime and Its Contents$
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Michael Pelczar

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780198732655

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732655.001.0001

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The conscious self

The conscious self

(p.178) 10 The conscious self

Michael Pelczar

Oxford University Press

Chapter 10 considers the main reductive analyses of the conscious self. Each of these analyses fails, at least when interpreted as an attempt to capture what we mean whenever we talk about conscious selves (subjects, minds). From this, we might conclude that conscious selfhood is metaphysically or conceptually fundamental, or that conscious selves are somehow mere fictions. But a more reasonable conclusion to draw is that we mean somewhat different things by “conscious self” (or “same conscious self”) on relevantly different occasions. In this view, each of the failed analyses of the conscious self succeeds as an articulation of one of the several things we mean on different occasions when speaking of conscious selves. This particularist conception of conscious selfhood is consistent with phenomenalism, since phenomenalism is consistent with each of these several meanings.

Keywords:   self, conscious subject, reductionism, anti-realism, particularism

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