Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
ObjectsNothing out of the Ordinary$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Daniel Z. Korman

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780198732532

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732532.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 21 March 2019

Arbitrariness

Arbitrariness

Chapter:
(p.124) 8 Arbitrariness
Source:
Objects
Author(s):

Daniel Z. Korman

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732532.003.0008

Arbitrariness arguments turn on the claim that there is no ontologically significant difference between certain of the objects that conservatives do believe in and certain of the ones they don’t. This chapter shows how conservatives can identify ontologically significant differences in a wide range of cases. It argues that certain arbitrariness arguments can be defused by treating grammatically singular terms like ‘the Supreme Court’ as referentially plural, referring not to a single scattered object, but to nine objects (the nine justices), and shows that others can be defused by holding that the presence of creative intentions can make a difference to which objects exist.

Keywords:   arbitrariness, artifacts, roles, phases, plural reference, Supreme Court, scattered objects, mereological essentialism, transitivity of parthood, creative intentions

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .