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The Political Economy of European Banking Union$
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David Howarth and Lucia Quaglia

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780198727927

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198727927.001.0001

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European Banking Systems in Times of Crisis

European Banking Systems in Times of Crisis

Chapter:
(p.50) 4 European Banking Systems in Times of Crisis
Source:
The Political Economy of European Banking Union
Author(s):

David Howarth

Lucia Quaglia

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198727927.003.0004

This chapter examines the configuration of the six case studies by considering several measures potentially relevant to national preferences on Banking Union. The importance of very large cross-border banks to explaining the interest of governments in Banking Union and their preferences on the specific elements of Banking Union varied. Five other factors had a significant impact upon national preferences: banking-system-wide internationalization patterns; specifically euro periphery (sovereign and other debt) exposure; the presence and organization of alternative banks; bank capital and liquidity; and the ‘health’ of the banking system. A range of further specific features are considered, including banks’ risk-weighted assets and reliance on short-term funding. Moreover, the ‘perceived manageability’ of real and potential bank losses was mainly linked to the ‘health’ of the national banking system, its relative size, and the state of public finances, shaping government concerns with regard to moral hazard, and, hence, national preferences on Banking Union.

Keywords:   Banking systems, cross-border banks, alternative banks, sovereign debt, risk-weighted assets, bank capital, short-term funding, moral hazard

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