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The Political Economy of European Banking Union$
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David Howarth and Lucia Quaglia

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780198727927

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198727927.001.0001

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Understanding Economic and Monetary Union to Understand Banking Union

Understanding Economic and Monetary Union to Understand Banking Union

Chapter:
(p.8) 2 Understanding Economic and Monetary Union to Understand Banking Union
Source:
The Political Economy of European Banking Union
Author(s):

David Howarth

Lucia Quaglia

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198727927.003.0002

This chapter begins by reviewing the literature on the politics and economics of EMU, asking to what extent the explanations put forward regarding the establishment and the design of EMU might have explanatory power with reference to the establishment and the design of Banking Union. The chapter then reviews the literature on Banking Union, which, with some notable exceptions, so far has mainly focused on the economic and legal aspects of the Union’s main components. The chapter elucidates the two-step analytical framework underpinning our study—namely, the concept of the trilemma, which explains the functional drive towards Banking Union; the main features of national financial systems, which, together with the concern for moral hazard, account for the preferences of the member states on the Union’s main components and the asymmetric distribution of bargaining power—which resulted in an asymmetric design of Banking Union.

Keywords:   Banking Union, Economic and Monetary Union, EMU, analytical framework, trilemma, moral hazard, preferences, bargaining power

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