Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Oxford Studies in Experimental PhilosophyVolume 1$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Joshua Knobe, Tania Lombrozo, and Shaun Nichols

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780198718765

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198718765.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 14 August 2018

A Scientific Case for Conceptual Dualism*

A Scientific Case for Conceptual Dualism*

The Problem of Consciousness and the Opposing Domains Hypothesis

Chapter:
(p.173) 7 A Scientific Case for Conceptual Dualism*
Source:
Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy
Author(s):

Anthony I. Jack

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198718765.003.0008

For centuries philosophers have suggested that it may not be possible to explain human conscious experience purely in terms of physical processes. This chapter reviews evidence from cognitive neuroscience and individual difference measures which supports this view, and develops a theoretical account of both the explanatory gap and belief in ontological dualism. It is argued that our cognitive structure links our understanding of phenomenal experience to moral concern for others, and that this empathetic mode of understanding is in tension with an empirical mode understanding. The evidence suggests that we are not cognitively capable of forming a single unified world view which recognizes both persons and the sub-personal processes of the mind. Implications for philosophical and psychological approaches to the mind are briefly discussed.

Keywords:   consciousness, explanatory gap, mind-body problem, default mode network, task positive network, anti-correlated networks, psychopathy, callous affect, empathetic concern, dehumanizing

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .