Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Moral Psychology and Human AgencyPhilosophical Essays on the Science of Ethics$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780198717812

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198717812.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 14 August 2018

Does Evolutionary Psychology Show That Normativity Is Mind-Dependent?

Does Evolutionary Psychology Show That Normativity Is Mind-Dependent?

Chapter:
(p.215) 10 Does Evolutionary Psychology Show That Normativity Is Mind-Dependent?
Source:
Moral Psychology and Human Agency
Author(s):

Selim Berker

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198717812.003.0010

Suppose we grant that evolutionary forces have had a profound effect on the contours of our normative judgments and intuitions. Can we conclude anything from this about the correct metaethical theory? This chapter argues that, for the most part, we cannot. Focusing attention on Sharon Street’s justly famous argument that the evolutionary origins of our normative judgments and intuitions cause insuperable epistemological difficulties for a metaethical view she calls “normative realism,” the chapter argues that there are two largely independent lines of argument in Street’s work which need to be teased apart. The first of these involves a genuine appeal to evolutionary considerations, but it can fairly easily be met by her opponents. The second line of argument is more troubling; it raises a significant problem, one of the most difficult in all of philosophy, namely how to justify our reliance on our most basic cognitive faculties without relying on those same faculties in a question-begging manner. However, evolutionary considerations add little to this old problem, and rejecting normative realism is not a way to solve it.

Keywords:   antirealism, evolutionary ethics, grounding, metaphysical dependence, normative judgments, reduction, Street

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .