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Berkeley's Puzzle
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Berkeley's Puzzle: What Does Experience Teach Us?

John Campbell and Quassim Cassam

Abstract

Sensory experience seems to be the foundation of our knowledge of mind-independent things. But how can that be? Sensory experience provides knowledge of nothing but sensory experience itself. What solves this puzzle, Chapters 1–4 show, is a view of sensory experience as a relation, more primitive than thought, between the perceiver and high-level objects and properties in the mind-independent world. Mind-independence is explained as the causal autonomy of physical objects, the fact that physical objects themselves are the mechanisms by which causal influence is transmitted from place to place. ... More

Keywords: perception, representation, relationalism, Berkeley, mind-independence, representationalism, non-conceptual content, experientialism, phenomenal intentionality

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2014 Print ISBN-13: 9780198716259
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2014 DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716259.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

John Campbell, author
University of California, Berkeley

Quassim Cassam, author
University of Warwick