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Being, Freedom, and MethodThemes from the Philosophy of Peter van Inwagen$
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John A. Keller

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198715702

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2017

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198715702.001.0001

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Properties as Parts of Ordinary Objects

Properties as Parts of Ordinary Objects

Chapter:
(p.62) 3 Properties as Parts of Ordinary Objects
Source:
Being, Freedom, and Method
Author(s):

Eric T. Olson

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198715702.003.0004

The so-called constituent ontology says that the properties of a concrete particular are constituents of it: parts, or something like parts. This is supposed to account for the character of particulars. The chapter argues that the constituent ontology cannot account for a thing’s character. Further, it entails the existence both of immaterial thinking beings and of objects with an impossible character. Some of these difficulties could be avoided by denying that constituency is a sort of parthood or anything like parthood. But this amounts to rejecting the distinguishing feature of the constituent ontology, leaving it indistinguishable from so-called relational ontologies.

Keywords:   properties, constituent ontology, relational ontology, material objects, mereology, particulars

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