This chapter introduces a new form of expressivist theory, Tempered Relational Expressivism. The ideas of a tempered expressivist theory and of relational expressivism are introduced, and it is shown that tempered relational expressivism can be thought of as a strict generalization on a kind of hybrid expressivism. According to tempered relational expressivism, moral sentences express states of mind that consist in a certain relationsip holding between one’s cognitive and noncognitive states of mind—a relationship that cannot be vacuous with respect to its cognitive relatum. This chapter shows how such a theory can take advantage of hybrid expressivism’s treatments of the Frege-Geach Problem and the wishful thinking problem while relaxing its realistic commitments and avoiding the problems explored in Capter 6.
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