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Expressing Our AttitudesExplanation and Expression in Ethics, Volume 2$
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Mark Schroeder

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780198714149

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198714149.001.0001

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Hybrid Expressivism

Hybrid Expressivism

Virtues and Vices

(p.135) 6 Hybrid Expressivism
Expressing Our Attitudes

Mark Schroeder

Oxford University Press

Many recent theorists, prominently including David Copp, Michael Ridge, and Daniel Boisvert, but also many others, have advocated combining aspects of metaethical expressivism with aspects of metaethical cognitivism, resulting in views that might properly be called ‘hybrid’. Such theories generally aspire to share the advantages of traditional cognitivism over traditional noncognitivism with respect to the Frege-Geach Problem, while sharing the advantages of traditional noncogntitivism over traditional cognitivism with respect to understanding and accounting for moral motiviation. This chapter systematizes the relationships between many such views, and argues that the only defensible views in this ballpark must take a very particular form.

Keywords:   hybrid expressivism, David Copp, Michael Ridge, Daniel Boisvert, motivation, Frege-Geach Problem

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