This introduction provides a guide to how to read the following chapters as offering a unified argument, and develops several new arguments of its own. Expressivism is introduced, along with the Expressivist Attitude Dialectic, a set of pressures that push expressivist to adopt substantial commitments in the philosophy of mind. Both the negation problem and the problem of mixed disjunctions are sharpened, and the idea that expressivism may be best understood as a novel view about the nature of propositions and propositional attitudes is introduced. This idea is in turn illustrated through comparison of four distinct expressivist responses to the expressivist attitude dialectic, three of which are developed in later chapters, and new arguments are advanced against the other, a view called hyperplanner stalnakerianism. Finally, expressivism is compared to relativism.
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