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Evidence and AgencyNorms of Belief for Promising and Resolving$
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Berislav Marušić

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780198714040

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198714040.001.0001

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The Evidentialist Response

The Evidentialist Response

(p.99) 5 The Evidentialist Response
Evidence and Agency

Berislav Marušić

Oxford University Press

This chapter considers and rejects the Evidentialist Response. According to this response, which is suggested by David Velleman, we should not promise or resolve to do something if we have evidence that there is a significant chance that we will fail to follow through. The chapter clarifies the commitments of the Evidentialist Response that go beyond evidentialism about the norms of belief. It then rejects the Evidentialist Response on the grounds that it requires us to predict what we will do when we should decide what to do and, in so doing, assumes an implausible view of the weight of practical reasons. The chapter also offers an account of epistemic evasion—a phenomenon akin to Sartrean bad faith—which consists in a denial of responsibility for our agency.

Keywords:   evidentialism, David Velleman, decision, prediction, weight of reasons, epistemic evasion, bad faith, Jean-Paul Sartre

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