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About OneselfDe Se Thought and Communication$
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Manuel García-Carpintero and Stephan Torre

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780198713265

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713265.001.0001

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Token-Reflexive Presuppositions and the De Se

Token-Reflexive Presuppositions and the De Se

Chapter:
(p.179) 7 Token-Reflexive Presuppositions and the De Se
Source:
About Oneself
Author(s):

Manuel García-Carpintero

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713265.003.0007

Inspired by Castañeda (1966, 1968), Perry (1979) and Lewis (1979) showed a specific variety of singular thoughts, thoughts about oneself “as oneself”—de se thoughts, Lewis called them—that raise special issues, and they advanced rival accounts. Their suggestive examples raise the problem of de se thought—how to characterize it so as to give an accurate account of the data, tracing its relations to singular thoughts in general. The main tenets of the two contrasting accounts—Lewisian and Perrian—are rehearsed in the first section of this chapter, together with some weaknesses of Perry’s presentation of his view. In the second, a proposal is presented, a specific elaboration of the Perrian account which overcomes the weaknesses. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of reasons for preferring one or another account, in particular regarding the issue of the communication of de se thoughts.

Keywords:   first-personal reference, de se attitudes, quasi-indicators, presuppositions, singular reference

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