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About OneselfDe Se Thought and Communication$
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Manuel García-Carpintero and Stephan Torre

Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780198713265

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713265.001.0001

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Constancy in Variation

Constancy in Variation

An Argument for Centering the Contents of Experience?

Chapter:
(p.56) 3 Constancy in Variation
Source:
About Oneself
Author(s):

Kathrin Glüer

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713265.003.0003

When you look at a circular plate at an angle, it looks circular. But there also is a certain sense in which its look can be described as oval. When you move, the plate’s look changes with your perspective on it—nevertheless, it continues to look circular. This chapter investigates whether these “constancy in variation” phenomena can be explained in terms of the representational content of visual experience, and whether constancy in variation provides special, phenomenological, reasons to construe experience as having centered contents. Concentrating on shape, it argues that due to warring phenomenological demands, all views construing constancy in variation as representation of both objective and perspectival properties or features have limited explanatory powers, and that centering does not provide any advantage. By contrast, adopting the non-standard intentionalism called phenomenal intentionalism, we get rather natural explanations of the phenomenology of constancy in variation.

Keywords:   shape constancy, perceptual experience, representational content, centered content, phenomenal intentionalism, variation constancy

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