What They Must Be, and What They Cannot Be
An extremely modest and, hence, uncontentious version of the transparency of experience entails that phenomenal qualities are amongst the fundamental building blocks of our, lived, manifest or common-sense world. As such, all attempts to conceive of them physicalistically seem to be self-destructive: I do not construct my manifest world out of neural firing frequencies. In particular, the phenomenal concept strategy (PCS) can give no account of how a neural state can manifest itself as the sort of sensible quality out of which our apparent world is constructed. In fact, PCS does not even begin to touch the ‘hard problem’ that faces physicalism.
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