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Phenomenal QualitiesSense, Perception, and Consciousness$
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Paul Coates and Sam Coleman

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780198712718

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712718.001.0001

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Phenomenal Qualities

Phenomenal Qualities

What They Must Be, and What They Cannot Be

Chapter:
(p.103) 3 Phenomenal Qualities
Source:
Phenomenal Qualities
Author(s):

Howard Robinson

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712718.003.0004

An extremely modest and, hence, uncontentious version of the transparency of experience entails that phenomenal qualities are amongst the fundamental building blocks of our, lived, manifest or common-sense world. As such, all attempts to conceive of them physicalistically seem to be self-destructive: I do not construct my manifest world out of neural firing frequencies. In particular, the phenomenal concept strategy (PCS) can give no account of how a neural state can manifest itself as the sort of sensible quality out of which our apparent world is constructed. In fact, PCS does not even begin to touch the ‘hard problem’ that faces physicalism.

Keywords:   explanatory gap, hard problem, knowledge argument, physicalism, phenomenal concept strategy, phenomenal qualities, transparency

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