Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Leibniz’s Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780198712664

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712664.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2017. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 12 December 2017

Necessity revisited

Necessity revisited

Chapter:
(p.118) 9 Necessity revisited
Source:
Leibniz’s Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles
Author(s):

Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712664.003.0009

Chapter 9 revisits the topic of the necessity of the Identity of Indiscernibles. There is a passage from a letter to Johann Bernoulli of 1699 and some passages from the letters to Clarke where Leibniz seems to commit to the contingency of the Identity of Indiscernibles. The issue is aggravated in the letters to Clarke because in that work Leibniz also commits himself to the necessity of the Identity of Indiscernibles. The chapter also examines these passages, paying a close look at their contexts, and concludes that there is little evidence that Leibniz thought the Identity of Indiscernibles to be contingent. It is also explained why Leibniz seems to commit to the contingency of the Identity of Indiscernibles in his letters to Clarke.

Keywords:   Bernoulli, Clarke, contingency, necessity

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .