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Leibniz’s Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles$
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Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780198712664

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712664.001.0001

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Minds

Minds

Chapter:
(p.170) 13 Minds
Source:
Leibniz’s Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles
Author(s):

Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712664.003.0013

This chapter focuses on Leibniz’s argument that the mind is not a blank tablet or tabula rasa, since such blank tablets would be perfectly similar. But the argument does not work, since it wrongly presupposes that if the mind is a blank tablet, then the mind does not always think. The chapter also discusses Leibniz’s arguments, from the Identity of Indiscernibles, for the theses that there is no mind without thoughts, no substance that does not act, no indifference of equilibrium, and no indiscernible embodied minds.

Keywords:   actions, indifference of equilibrium, minds, tabula rasa, thought

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