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Bargaining on Nuclear Tests
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Bargaining on Nuclear Tests: Washington and its Cold War Deals

Or Rabinowitz

Abstract

Most observers who follow nuclear affairs agree on one major aspect regarding Israel’s famous policy of nuclear ambiguity—mainly that it is an exception. More specifically, it is largely accepted that the 1969 Nixon-Meir understanding, which formally established Israel’s policy of nuclear ambiguity and transformed it from an undeclared Israeli strategy into a long-lasting undisclosed bilateral agreement, was in fact a singularity, aimed at allowing Washington to turn a blind eye to the existence of an Israeli arsenal. According to conventional wisdom, this nuclear bargain was a foreign policy ... More

Keywords: nuclear tests, Israel, Pakistan, South Africa, nuclear bargains, Nixon-Meir deal

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2014 Print ISBN-13: 9780198702931
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: June 2014 DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198702931.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Or Rabinowitz, author
Research Associate, Centre for Science and Security Studies, King's College London