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Rational Animals$
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Susan Hurley and Matthew Nudds

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780198528272

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198528272.001.0001

ContentsFRONT MATTER

Do animals know what they know?

Chapter:
(p. 235 ) Chapter 11 Do animals know what they know?
Source:
Rational Animals?
Author(s):

Sara J. Shettleworth

Jennifer E. Sutton

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198528272.003.0011

This chapter examines whether success on behavioural tests for metacognition in animals can be explained in other, deflationary ways. While it is not possible to assess whether animals have a feeling of knowing, having the right controls can help define functionally similar behaviour and thus assess whether animals' performance depends on metacognitive information. One important control in metacognitive paradigms is randomly intermixed forced trials where the escape option is omitted and another is to transfer the animal to tests with new stimuli.

Keywords:   animals, behaviour, metacognition

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