Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Rational Animals$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Susan Hurley and Matthew Nudds

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780198528272

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198528272.001.0001

ContentsFRONT MATTER

Descartes' two errors: Reason and reflection in the great apes

Chapter:
(p. 219 ) Chapter 10 Descartes' two errors: Reason and reflection in the great apes
Source:
Rational Animals?
Author(s):

Josep Call

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198528272.003.0010

This chapter examines reason and reflection in the great apes. It presents a variety of behavioural evidence that is best explained either by causal reasoning or by metacognition and analyses the between capacities for reasoning and for metacognition. It evaluates the results of a study which suggest that apes do not simply associate a cue with the presence of food, but understand that the food is the cause of the cue, and can reason accordingly. This behaviour can be regarded as evidence of a capacity for proto-logical reasoning that relies on pairs of contraries and conditional dependence based on causal dependence.

Keywords:   reason, reflection, apes, causal reasoning, metacognition, proto-logical reasoning, conditional dependence, causal dependence

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .