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Welfare, Incentives, and Taxation$
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James Mirrlees

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780198295211

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198295211.001.0001

The Optimal Structure of Incent ives and Authority within an Organization

Chapter:
(p. 387 ) 16 The Optimal Structure of Incent ives and Authority within an Organization
Source:
Welfare, Incentives, and Taxation
Author(s):

James A. Mirrlees

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198295211.003.0019

This chapter discusses a number of models that can help explain the distribution of incomes within the firm, and to explain the existence of authoritative relationships. These models also help derive a hierarchical structure and investigate its effects on production. One of the assumptions of these models is that workers are able to predict their own activity and rewards within the organization.

Keywords:   models, incomes, authoritative relationships, hierarchical structure, production, rewards, workers, organization

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