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Labour and the Political Economy in Israel$

Michael Shalev

Print publication date: 1992

Print ISBN-13: 9780198285137

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198285137.001.0001

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(p.346) Appendix 3: Linkages between union peak organizations and labour parties (after Bahat, 1979) (p.347) (p.348)

(p.346) Appendix 3: Linkages between union peak organizations and labour parties (after Bahat, 1979) (p.347) (p.348)

Labour and the Political Economy in Israel
Oxford University Press





(1) References to party in peak organization’s constitution.

Specifies party’s role in elections.

Commitments to co- operation, but party not named.


(2) References to peak organization in party constitution.

Union membership requirement; party cells in unions; union officials subject to party discipline.

Union membership expected; unions affiliated collectively; union is primary party cell.


(3) Legitimate party role in union elections.

Party-list elections.

Personal elections, but party factions allowed.


(4) Legitimate union role in financing party.

National level only.

Both national and local levels.


(5) Proportion of union members who vote Labour (c. 1970).


c. 70%


(6) Proportion of union members belonging to party (c.1975).

20% (15%)

16% (11%)


(7) Proportion of party members belonging to union (c.1975).




(8) Party role in nominating candidates for union office.

Official and determinate.

Only partly official, but determinate.

Unofficial, but determinate.

(9) Presence of party members in top union bodies.

Virtually universal.

Vast majority.

Vast majority.

(10) Framework of party delegates’ activity in union.

Official party factions.

Nothing official; some covert factional activity.

Nothing official; some overt factional activity.

(11) Dual office in top union and party bodies.

Very common.



(12) Dual office in top union bodies and Parliament.

Rare simultaneously, can occur during career.

Uncommon simultaneously, common during career.

Very common simultaneously, common during career.

(13) Importance of union support for party finances.

More important than both dues and state support.

More important than both dues and state support.

More important than dues, less important than state support.

(14) Union-party policy co- ordination.

Party traditionally set union policy and mediated union-government conflict.

Ramified network of formal co-ordinating bodies.

Close informal ties between Union and party leaders.

Sources Notes

This table is derived from findings reported by Shmuel Bahat (1979). Bahat’s research utilized secondary analysis of official publications, opinion polls, and so forth, complemented by interviews and observation in the field. Below is a list of the items in the table, referenced by number, indicating the appropriate source in Bahat’s thesis and (where necessary) adding explanatory remarks. In general, note that ‘union peak organization’ means the Histadrut in Israel, LO in Norway, and DGB in Germany. ‘Labour parties’ refers to Norway’s Labour Party and the German SPD. The reference in Israel is to the Labour Party and not its Alignment with Mapam, except for items (5) and (9).

(1) From ch. 3.

(2) From ch. 3.

(3) From ch. 2 and 5.

(4) From ch. 7.

(5) pp. 71 and 72 for the results of voter surveys in Germany and Norway respectively. For Israel, we have indicated a compromise between the divergent findings reported by Arian (1973) and Burstein (1973). The figure in the table is indicative of the order of magnitude c. 1970, which has undoubtedly declined since then.

(6) From pp. 85–6. The German figure refers to DGB members only. Figures in parentheses were adjusted by Bahat to take account of inflated claims and involuntary affiliation.

(7) From p. 87.

(8) From p. 116.

(9) From ch. 5. Refers to both elective and appointive positions, the characterization holding in each case for both types.

(10) From p. 115.

(11) From ch. 6.

(12) From ch. 6.

(13) From ch. 7. Reflects both monetary and in-kind support.

(14) From ch. 8.