Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Ambiguity and DeterrenceBritish Nuclear Strategy 1945-1964$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

John Baylis

Print publication date: 1995

Print ISBN-13: 9780198280125

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198280125.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 20 October 2018

Eden and the Policy of Strategic Expediency 1955–1956

Eden and the Policy of Strategic Expediency 1955–1956

(p.206) 7 Eden and the Policy of Strategic Expediency 1955–1956
Ambiguity and Deterrence

John Baylis

Oxford University Press

This chapter describes the opposing statements and propositions about the British nuclear methodologies during the mid-1950s, which happened to be under Prime Minister Anthony Eden's rule. Such contradictions are evident in the discordant views between the Army and Navy of Britain, as well as the Royal Air Force, regarding the issue of regaining international control of the Suez Canal through increased reliance on the United States. Because of this, the administration failed its military adventure, which led to Russian protest, national opposition, discharge of support from America, and eventually, Eden's resignation. The techniques employed by the regime were perhaps inadequate to justify re-entitlement of international authority.

Keywords:   Anthony Eden, British strategic planning, Army, Navy, Royal Air Force

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .