Eden and the Policy of Strategic Expediency 1955–1956
This chapter describes the opposing statements and propositions about the British nuclear methodologies during the mid-1950s, which happened to be under Prime Minister Anthony Eden's rule. Such contradictions are evident in the discordant views between the Army and Navy of Britain, as well as the Royal Air Force, regarding the issue of regaining international control of the Suez Canal through increased reliance on the United States. Because of this, the administration failed its military adventure, which led to Russian protest, national opposition, discharge of support from America, and eventually, Eden's resignation. The techniques employed by the regime were perhaps inadequate to justify re-entitlement of international authority.
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