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Nuclear Weapons and British Strategic Planning, 1955–1958$
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Martin S. Navias

Print publication date: 1991

Print ISBN-13: 9780198277545

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198277545.001.0001

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(p.240) Conclusion
Nuclear Weapons and British Strategic Planning, 1955–1958

Martins S. Navias

Oxford University Press

This chapter uses previous discussions in an attempt to assess a claim made by Clark and Wheeler in their study of British nuclear strategy in the first post-war decade that ‘the erosion of British nuclear strategy was to coincide with the articulation of a public doctrine of independence, as in the White Paper of 1957’. It analyses both the veracity of this contention and then the causes of this irony. By so doing it helps set pointers for analysing the progress of British nuclear strategy in the 1960s and beyond.

Keywords:   Clark and Wheeler, defence policy, nuclear weapons, British nuclear strategic policy, Clark and Wheeler

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