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The Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law$
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David G. Owen

Print publication date: 1997

Print ISBN-13: 9780198265795

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198265795.001.0001

Necessary and Sufficient Conditions in Tort Law

Chapter:
(p. 363 ) Necessary and Sufficient Conditions in Tort Law
Source:
The Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law
Author(s):

TONY HONORÉ

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198265795.003.0017

Argument about causation inside and outside the law is often concerned with the following question: Must a cause be a necessary condition of a result, a sufficient condition of the result, or a necessary element in a set of conditions jointly sufficient to produce the result? This chapter supports the third view, both outside the law and inside it, whenever a sequence of physical events is in issue. A different but related idea can be used to explain reasons for human action, ‘causing’ or inducing people to act rather than causing things to happen. When causal connection must be proved, the law also settles what must be shown to have caused what. Tort law generally imposes fault liability on people who by their wrongful conduct cause harm to others; but sometimes it imposes strict liability on people whose specially dangerous activities, though not wrongful, cause others harm.

Keywords:   causation, necessary condition, causal connection, tort law, harm, strict liability, dangerous activities

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