Subjectivism, Objectivism and Criminal Attempts
It is sometimes unhelpful to portray controversies about the proper principles of criminal liability as controversies between ‘subjectivism’ and ‘objectivism’. In some contexts, there seems to be a clear distinction between ‘subjectivist’ and ‘objectivist’ principles of criminal liability, and controversies which embody that distinction. One such context is the law of attempts. Subjectivism distinguishes the subjective realm of choice, intention, and belief from the objective realm of actual facts or effects: what the agent intended and tried to do, or believed to be so, from what actually happened, or was actually so. Criminal liability should depend on culpability, and culpability requires control. If criminal conviction and punishment are to express appropriate blame or censure, then they too must depend in part on the actual or objective character of the criminal's actions.
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.