Adjudication for Pluralists
Suppose value pluralism is true. Will its truth have any effect whatsoever on the beliefs, self-understandings, and practices of legal academics, practitioners, and judges? This chapter argues that almost all of the jurisprudentially orthodox think value pluralism is true. This is important because many of the orthodox who believe in value pluralism fail to appreciate that the invocation of value pluralism ensures that their accounts of adjudication become all but indistinguishable, in two important and soon to be specified respects, from heretical accounts. This argument, if successful, can be regarded in two very different ways: either as an attempt to steal the thunder of heretics within contemporary legal scholarship or as an illustration of the surprisingly radical nature of orthodox jurisprudence. From either perspective, the conflict between orthodoxy and heresy in contemporary legal thought is less dramatic than it initially appears. In this chapter, only the work of Neil MacCormick, Joseph Raz, Ronald Dworkin, and a few others is tackled.
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