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Punishment, Responsibility, and JusticeA Relational Critique$
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Alan Norrie

Print publication date: 2000

Print ISBN-13: 9780198259565

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198259565.001.0001

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Conclusion

Conclusion

Chapter:
(p.222) 10 Conclusion
Source:
Punishment, Responsibility, and Justice
Author(s):

ALAN NORRIE

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198259565.003.0010

This book has developed an analysis that applies new methodological, historical, psychological, and ethical approaches to the liberal Kantianism which dominates criminal justice thinking. The product of this analysis is the idea of blame as a relational concept, and this concluding chapter locates the idea of a blaming relation in an overall view of the argument. The issues of morality and psychology are addressed, along with the crisis of orthodox subjectivism in English criminal law, false separation or excluded connection, entity relationism, analytical thinking, and the Kantian morality of form.

Keywords:   criminal justice, blame, morality of form, psychology, orthodox subjectivism, criminal law, false separation, entity relationism, Kantianism

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