Absence of agreement on the most fundamental questions concerning the interpretation of David Hume's views on mind and morality complements an utter absence of agreement as to the soundness of his views, and as to the cogency — and even the aptness — of the arguments he musters in their support. This book explores Hume's efforts to found a theory of morality on a theory of mind. Hume's finished theory of mind and morality — his expanded moral conativism — will emerge from reflection on the character of reasons for action; on the interrelations of the primitive notions of desire, volition, and affection; and on the inadequacies of moral cognitivism. Its key conception is that of specifically moral desires, desires whose careful characterization contributes to Hume's elaboration of a general theory of moral sentiments; of a complex account of the connections between morality, justice, and convention; and of a theory of specifically moral agents.
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.