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Mind and MoralityAn Examination of Hume's Moral Psychology$
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John Bricke

Print publication date: 2000

Print ISBN-13: 9780198250111

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250111.001.0001

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(p.1) Introduction
Mind and Morality

John Bricke

Oxford University Press

Absence of agreement on the most fundamental questions concerning the interpretation of David Hume's views on mind and morality complements an utter absence of agreement as to the soundness of his views, and as to the cogency — and even the aptness — of the arguments he musters in their support. This book explores Hume's efforts to found a theory of morality on a theory of mind. Hume's finished theory of mind and morality — his expanded moral conativism — will emerge from reflection on the character of reasons for action; on the interrelations of the primitive notions of desire, volition, and affection; and on the inadequacies of moral cognitivism. Its key conception is that of specifically moral desires, desires whose careful characterization contributes to Hume's elaboration of a general theory of moral sentiments; of a complex account of the connections between morality, justice, and convention; and of a theory of specifically moral agents.

Keywords:   David Hume, mind, morality, moral conativism, action, desire, justice, convention, moral agents, affection

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