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SelvesAn Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics$
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Galen Strawson

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780198250067

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250067.001.0001

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Metaphysics: The Question of Fact, 1

Metaphysics: The Question of Fact, 1

(p.323) Part 7 Metaphysics: The Question of Fact, 1

Galen Strawson (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter begins with a discussion of the thin conception, according to which a subject of experience is something that exists only if experience exists of which it is the subject. It explores Descartes' endorsement of the thin conception of the subject, which is fundamental to his conception of the I or mind or soul or self or subject in that it doesn't and can't exist in the absence of experience or consciousness — in his terminology — ‘thinking’ or ‘thought’ (cogitatio). The chapter then considers Fichte, Husserl, Nozick, James, and Hume.

Keywords:   thin subjects, I, Descartes, Fichte, Husserl, Nozick, James, Hume

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