Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Aristotle's Ethical Theory$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

W.F.R. Hardie

Print publication date: 1980

Print ISBN-13: 9780198246329

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198246329.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 22 September 2018



(p.294) XIV Pleasure
Aristotle's Ethical Theory

W.F.R. Hardie

Oxford University Press

The EN contains two separate discussions or discourses on pleasure: VII. 11–14 (A) and X. 1–5 (B). Aristotle's own view is indicated in A only by the unelaborated and undefended assertion that pleasure is not to be defined, with the anti-hedonists, as ‘perceived process of becoming’but rather as ‘unimpeded activity’. This definition, unless qualified as it is in B, would imply that happiness could be identified with pleasure, if there are pleasures which are bad, with some particular pleasure. B contains another version of the criticism of Speusippus. The treatment of the metaphysics of pleasure, in particular the argument that pleasure is imperfect because it is a process of movement or becoming, is more elaborate than it was in A.

Keywords:   hedonistic, Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Plato, happiness, Speuisippus

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .