Resolution of Six Difficulties for a Mathematicist Account of Judicial Proof
This chapter shows the resolution of six difficulties for a mathematicist account of judicial proof. It first reports the difficulty about conjunction. It also addresses the difficulty about inference. The non-complementational negation principle for inductive probability ensures that, on an inductivist account, the standard of proof in civil cases does not officially condone a positive probability of injustice. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is proof at the level of inductive certainty. The inductivist analysis elucidates why ordinary juries are competent to assess judicial proofs. Moreover, convergence and corroboration, and their appropriate independence conditions, can be readily explained in terms of inductive probability, with no difficulty arising about prior probabilities.
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.