In this chapter, requirements are laid down for what is called an R-statement; this, if there were such a thing, would be a hardcore example of a report of an ‘experience’ in the problematic conception or misconception. The ambiguous requirement might be satisfied vacuously, trivially; by the act's just being, as distinct from being the object of, a certain sort of awareness – if the act is a form of b-experiencing or sb-experiencing. If someone who speaks of visual experiences has in mind things (s)b-experienced, then one can point out that there will not be these without acts of (s)b-experiencing. It may, for all that this ambiguous requirement says to the contrary, be that the act is ca-2-experienced; is one of a kind which is somehow necessarily accompanied by one's having some suitable sort of awareness of it.
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