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Objects of Thought$
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A. N. Prior, P. T. Geach, and A. J. P. Kenny

Print publication date: 1971

Print ISBN-13: 9780198243540

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198243540.001.0001

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Tarskian and Non-Tarskian Semantics

Tarskian and Non-Tarskian Semantics

Chapter:
(p.98) 7 Tarskian and Non-Tarskian Semantics
Source:
Objects of Thought
Author(s):

A. N. Prior

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198243540.003.0007

This chapter discusses Tarski's notion of truth and falsehood. The truth and falsehood with which Tarski is concerned are genuine properties of genuine objects, namely sentences. It is essential to Tarski's procedure to consider sentences as parts of a given language, and it is only as properties of sentences of a given language that ‘truth’ and ‘falsehood’ are defined by him. Moreover, the predicates ‘is true’ and ‘is false’ do not themselves belong to the language consisting of the sentences of which they are predicated.

Keywords:   Tarski, truth, falsehood, sentences

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