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Objects of Thought$
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A. N. Prior, P. T. Geach, and A. J. P. Kenny

Print publication date: 1971

Print ISBN-13: 9780198243540

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198243540.001.0001

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Extensionality and Propositional Identity

Extensionality and Propositional Identity

(p.48) 4 Extensionality and Propositional Identity
Objects of Thought

A. N. Prior

Oxford University Press

This chapter focuses on a particular error: the treatment of truth-values as the denotata of sentences, and the confusion of propositional identity with material equivalence. It begins with a discussion of the fallacy of extensionalism. It then discusses Frege on functions and values, equivalence and propositional identity, the ‘quotation-marks’ objection, and the parallel between truth-values and classes.

Keywords:   extensionalism, Frege, function values, propositional identity, truth-values

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