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Objects of Thought$
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A. N. Prior, P. T. Geach, and A. J. P. Kenny

Print publication date: 1971

Print ISBN-13: 9780198243540

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198243540.001.0001

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Russellian Names and Descriptions

Russellian Names and Descriptions

Chapter:
(p.144) 10 Russellian Names and Descriptions
Source:
Objects of Thought
Author(s):

A. N. Prior

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198243540.003.0010

This chapter considers a second theory concerning the conditions under which a belief can constitute a relation between a believer and an object that the belief is about. The theory is that this can occur only if the believer knows, beyond any possibility of mistake, that the object in question exists. It is perhaps easier to consider this type of theory, to begin with, in connection with saying rather than believing. The corresponding theory about saying would be broadly that X is able to say something of Y if he is in a position to refer to Y by means of a ‘logically proper name’ in Russell's sense; or that when X says that Y ϕ's, this constitutes a genuine relation between X and Y if and only if in saying that Y ϕ's, X refers to Y by means of a Russellian proper name.

Keywords:   belief, relation, object, saying, Russell

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