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The Mind MattersConsciousness and Choice in a Quantum World$
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David Hodgson

Print publication date: 1993

Print ISBN-13: 9780198240686

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240686.001.0001

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The Self

The Self

Chapter:
(p.403) 17 The Self
Source:
The Mind Matters
Author(s):

David Hodgson

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240686.003.0018

Each person tends to see himself or herself as a single conscious subject or self, with identity and continuity over time, and with no other or rival subject involved in the same brain. This chapter pursues the topic further, attempting to justify its preoccupation with conscious subjects or selves, rather than complete physical-mental persons. It looks briefly at Descartes's famous argument for the existence of selves, and at how this fares from the consensus viewpoint. Next, it outlines philosopher Derek Parfit's reductionist view of the self, which seems to be the plausible outcome of the consensus approach. Finally, it cites reasons for holding that, contrary to Parfit's view, there is a deep further fact of personal identity or continuity, over and above physical and psychological continuity as generally understood.

Keywords:   persons, selves, Descartes, mind theory, Derek Parfit

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