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PerceptionAn Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge$
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Bimal Krishna Matilal

Print publication date: 1991

Print ISBN-13: 9780198239765

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198239765.001.0001

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The Nature of Philosophical Argument

The Nature of Philosophical Argument

Chapter:
(p.69) 3 The Nature of Philosophical Argument
Source:
Perception
Author(s):

Bimal Krishna Matilal

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198239765.003.0004

This chapter aims to provide a somewhat broader perspective of Indian philosophy in the background of which philosophical arguments regarding perception and knowledge were developed. It deals with issues whose relevance with the main theme of this book may not be immediately obvious, but nevertheless the importance of these issues for forming a proper conception of what Indian philosophy is all about. The first section of this chapter contrasts philosophy with soteriology. The second section discusses the Nyāya project of philosophical inquiry. The third section considers debate and dialectic. The term ‘dialectic’ refers to the art of philosophic disputation in ancient India. The last section contrasts negation and refutation.

Keywords:   Indian philosophy, soteriology, negation, refutation, dialectic

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