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Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing

Miranda Fricker

Abstract

Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes of philosophy, but sometimes we would do well to focus instead on injustice. In epistemology, the very idea that there is a first-order ethical dimension to our epistemic practices — the idea that there is such a thing as epistemic justice — remains obscure until we adjust the philosophical lens so that we see through to the negative space that is epistemic injustice. This book argues that there is a distinctively epistemic genus of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower, wronged therefore in a capa ... More

Keywords: social power, credibility, prejudice, stereotype, epistemology of testimony, virtue epistemology, genealogy, objectification, silencing

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2007 Print ISBN-13: 9780198237907
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007 DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Miranda Fricker, author
Birkbeck College, University of London
Author Webpage