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Raw FeelingA philosophical account of the essence of consciousness$
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Robert Kirk

Print publication date: 1996

Print ISBN-13: 9780198236795

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198236795.001.0001

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Raw Feeling and the Intelligibility Gap

Raw Feeling and the Intelligibility Gap

(p.1) 1 Raw Feeling and the Intelligibility Gap
Raw Feeling

Robert Kirk

Oxford University Press

This chapter seeks to justify the contention that the notion of raw feeling is sound. It also makes clear what the intelligibility gap is. Another aim — the main one — is to develop solutions to the real problems, thereby showing how the intelligibility gap can be closed. The third aim is to make clear that the proposed solutions are solutions — to show that they require no leaps of faith. Resistance is likely from opposite directions. On one side are those who stick by the intuitions and find it hard to conceive how they could possibly be provided for by the means that will be employed. On the other side stand behaviourists, verificationists, Wittgensteinians, and eliminativists who reject the contention that there is a problem about consciousness.

Keywords:   colour-blindness, consciousness, raw feeling, epiphenomenalism, behaviourism

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