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An Essay on Belief and Acceptance$
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L. Jonathan Cohen

Print publication date: 1995

Print ISBN-13: 9780198236047

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198236047.001.0001

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Self-deceit and the Socratic Paradox

Self-deceit and the Socratic Paradox

(p.133) V Self-deceit and the Socratic Paradox
An Essay on Belief and Acceptance


Oxford University Press

While there may be instances wherein we are tempted to say that some people deliberately deceive themselves, self-deceit is a concept that is evidently paradoxical. Although previous proposals for resolving such may provide insufficient explanations, we may take on a different perspective that entails how self-deceit entails a suppressed thought persists despite how a person persuades himself into accepting a different belief. As such, there are also suggestions of how to resolve the Socratic paradox regarding self-control that may be just as unsatisfactory as in the former case. This chapter attempts to point out the consistencies attributed to how a particular agent's belief that he should not be conducting a certain act to how he accepts that he is actually pursuing this act.

Keywords:   Socratic paradox, self-control, self-deceit, belief, acceptance, paradox

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