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PluralismAgainst the Demand for Consensus$
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Nicholas Rescher

Print publication date: 1995

Print ISBN-13: 9780198236016

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198236016.001.0001

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Problems of Evaluative Consensus

Problems of Evaluative Consensus

Chapter:
(p.127) 7 Problems of Evaluative Consensus
Source:
Pluralism
Author(s):

Nicholas Rescher

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198236016.003.0007

This chapter discusses the problems related to the notion of evaluative consensus. It argues against the belief that normative matters are rooted in consensus and that value and virtue are ultimately conventional. It explains that the unachievability of evaluative consensus need not and should not be an obstacle to constructive communal coexistence in a well-ordered society. It suggests that communal concert and cooperation, in spite of its members' disagreement on evaluative matters and their different evaluative orientations, are characteristic hallmarks of a well-oriented society.

Keywords:   evaluative consensus, value, virtue, disagreement, communal coexistence, philosophy

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