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PluralismAgainst the Demand for Consensus$
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Nicholas Rescher

Print publication date: 1995

Print ISBN-13: 9780198236016

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198236016.001.0001

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Pluralism without Indifferentism

Pluralism without Indifferentism

(p.98) 6 Pluralism without Indifferentism

Nicholas Rescher

Oxford University Press

This chapter evaluates the possibility of a cognitive pluralism without indifferentist relativism. It suggests that pluralism is compatible with preferentialism and that a rationalistic preferentialism which insists on the correctness of one particular alternative is perfectly compatible with a pluralism that acknowledges that others may be fully rationally warranted and entitled to hold the variant position they adopt. This chapter concludes that it is fallacious to insist on a quest for consensus on the grounds that dissensus and pluralism are rationally intolerable.

Keywords:   cognitive pluralism, indifferentist relativism, preferentialism, dissensus, rationality

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