Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
PluralismAgainst the Demand for Consensus$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Nicholas Rescher

Print publication date: 1995

Print ISBN-13: 9780198236016

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198236016.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2017. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 19 November 2017

The Experiential Basis of Cognitive Diversity and the Unavoidability of Pluralism

The Experiential Basis of Cognitive Diversity and the Unavoidability of Pluralism

Chapter:
(p.64) 4 The Experiential Basis of Cognitive Diversity and the Unavoidability of Pluralism
Source:
Pluralism
Author(s):

Nicholas Rescher

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198236016.003.0004

This chapter argues against the principle of consensus on the grounds of the experiential basis of cognitive diversity and the unavoidability of pluralism. In explains that even when there is agreement about the aims and methods of a cognitive enterprise, inquirers would still arrive at discordant and conflicting results when the data produced by the course of their experience are different. Thus, cognitive dissensus is rendered inevitable by experiential diversity. This clearly indicates that the unavailability of consensus and the inescapability of cognitive pluralism are the realities of the life of reason.

Keywords:   consensus, cognitive diversity, pluralism, experiential diversity, reason

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .